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Russia’s position on the events in Kyrgyzstan 
(April – June 2010)
Wojciech Górecki
Russia was the first state in the world to de facto recognise the regime 
change in Kyrgyzstan that took place on 7 April 2010. This recogni-
tion, along with a previous campaign by the Russian media against the 
then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has given rise to suspicion that 
the events of April were provoked by Russia. However, it seems no 
more than reasonable to say that Russia provided some inspiration and 
lobbying in that direction. Russia offered support to the new Kyrgyz 
government almost immediately, albeit conditionally. Russia’s relations 
with Roza Otunbayeva’s government have been changing in nature; they 
are currently much cooler than they had been immediately after the 
coup. There are many indications that this change was a reaction to the 
extension of the lease agreement for the American military base in the 
Manas airport. At the same time, Moscow remains in contact with the 
political rivals to the current regime, which suggests that the Kremlin is 
preparing for different developments, and does not regard the current 
crisis as having been fully resolved.
Despite the interim government’s plea for help, Russia refused to un-
dertake military intervention in southern Kyrgyzstan, which plunged 
into ethnic unrest in June. This shows that Russia is wary of being 
dragged into a long-standing and bloody conflict in the region, which 
could entail considerable expenses and jeopardise Russia’s authority. 
It should be expected that after the October parliamentary elections 
in Kyrgyzstan, Russia will return to its plans to establish a second mi-
litary base in this country (in addition to the Kant base) to reinforce its 
dominant position in the region. This is the first time that Russia has had 
a real chance to play a stabilising role in the CIS area. How Russia copes 
with this challenge may decide its position in post-Soviet Central Asia – and 
in a wider context, its relations with NATO, the USA and China.
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Conditions of Russian policy in Kyrgyzstan
Russia’s key strategic objective in the Central Asia seems to be to monopolise the region’s 
security system, preferably under the aegis of a regional organisation (the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation [CSTO]) and to curb the influence and ambitions of other players, espe-
cially the USA and China. The Kremlin would only accept these players’ involvement if it had 
agreed upon this. One such example could be the functioning of the American base in the 
Manas airport near Bishkek1, which the US uses for the needs of military operation in Afgha-
nistan; Russia has repeatedly protested against the base’s operation, even though it improves 
the security situation of both the region and Russia itself.
Kyrgyzstan, located in a crucial trouble spot in Central Asia, is favourably disposed towards 
Russia, and therefore plays the role of a ‘foothold’ in this part of the CIS, from which Russia 
can keep or even extend its influence in the region (Armenia plays a similar role in Russian 
policy in the South Caucasus).
Moscow’s policy towards Kyrgyzstan employs three kinds of instruments: military, political, 
and economic. Russia has an air base in Kant at its disposal; this was opened on 22 Sep-
tember 2003, and about 1,500 soldiers are currently stationed there. Formally, the base is 
part of the CSTO’s Rapid Reaction Force, but in fact it is under control of and fully integrated 
with the Russian defence system. Russia also controls a communications hub in Chaldovar 
(near the city of Kara-Balta), and a test base for anti-submarine weapons located in Koisary, 
Issyk-Kul district.
Moscow has considerable leverage on 
Kyrgyzstan’s politicians. None of the ma-
jor political groups in that country has di-
splayed any anti-Russian orientation. Even 
the ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, 
whose decisions Moscow treated as hostile 
(such as the extension of the lease agreement with the United States concerning the Manas 
base), could hardly have been called ‘pro-Western’; his aim was always to manoeuvre be-
tween the USA and Russia, and play their contradictions off against each other. In doing so, 
he pursued not only the objectives of the Kyrgyz state, but also his own material interests. 
Currently, the most pro-Western politician is Ismail Isakov, the defence minister of the interim 
government, whose son is studying in a US military academy2. The Kyrgyz public is also rather 
favourably inclined towards Russia, both due to its apparent fondness for the Russian culture 
and language (Russian enjoys the status of an ‘official language’; according to estimates made 
in 2004, as much as 30% of the population use it in their everyday life3) and to the policy 
undertaken by the Russian authorities (Kyrgyz nationals who wish to apply for Russian citizen-
ship need not give up Kyrgyz citizenship; they can travel into Russia in search of work, etc.).
This state of affairs still prevails, despite some cases of anti-Russian sentiments stirred up 
by ethnically-motivated violence in Russia, which has been aimed at the Kyrgyz among other 
nations4. Since the ‘tulip revolution’ of 2005, Moscow has maintained contacts with all the 
major political and social groups in Kyrgyzstan. It also runs a consulate in Osh, along with the 
embassy in Bishkek5.
Russia has also tried to strengthen its leverage on the Kyrgyz economy6, especially in the 
energy (hydroelectric power plants), gas, oil and military industries. RAO UES Rossii and 
Gazprom have demonstrated the greatest interest in cooperating with Kyrgyzstan. In 2009, 
Moscow attempted to take over the majority stake of the Dastan arms factory.
 
 
1 The base was establishedin 
autumn 2001. It is used 
as a transit air freight hub for 
transporting soldiers and military 
equipment to Afghanistan. 
2 Eurasia Intelligence Report, 
no 2, 7 July 2010, p. 13.
3 Alexandr Arefyev, ‘Skolko ludey 
govoryat i budut govorit po-
russki?’ Demoskop Weekly, 
no. 251/252, August 2006.
4 Agata Dubas, ‘The menace of 
a ‘brown’ Russia. Ethnically 
motivated xenophobia – symp-
toms, causes and prospects 
for the future.’ OSW Studies, 
no 29, November 2008, p. 19; 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/osw-stu-
dies/2008-11-15/menace-a-
brown-russia-ethnically-motiva-
ted-xenophobia-symptoms-cau
5 The Russian Consul-General 
in Osh was Mukhammadzhan 
Ziganshin, a Tatar born in 
Uzbekistan, who knew Russian, 
Uzbek, Tatar, English, and French. 
He supervised the consulate 
from December 2007 to the 
moment of his sudden death 
of a heart attack on 16 May 
2010; http://tt.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Muhamadzhan_Ziganshin, 
accessed on 9 July 2010 and 
http://www.dipkurier.narod.ru/
dip97/gen.htm; accessed 
on 9 July 2010).
6 Wojciech Konończuk, ‘Russia 
uses the crisis to build influence 
in CIS countries’, Eastweek 
no 6 (156), 11 February 2009, 
www.osw.waw.pl
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Russian-Kyrgyz relations under Kurmanbek Bakiyev
After the ‘tulip revolution’ of 2005, Russia hoped that Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s government 
would take its own expectations into account. During his first visit to Moscow, Bakiyev cal-
led Russia ‘a key, strategic ally for Bishkek’. He also indicated that he was not inclined to 
keep the USA military base in Manas, although no actions to revoke the lease agreement 
were taken during his time in office. In all 
likelihood, the Kyrgyz government was not 
prepared to lose the fee for the port’s usage 
(over US$17 million annually) or the lucra-
tive contracts for all sorts of supplies to the 
base, especially fuels (which were provided 
by companies linked to the Bakiyev clan).
On 3 February 2009, Bakiyev announced 
that his government had decided to close 
down the base. This decision was doubtless forced upon him by Russia; almost immediately, 
an announcement was made that Russia would grant Kyrgyzstan US$2.15 billion of financial 
support (including a non-refundable grant of US$150 million and a loan of US$300 million on 
very favourable terms). These two sums (totalling US$450 million) were indeed transferred to 
Kyrgyzstan. The remaining loan of US$1.7 billion was designated for the construction of the 
Kambar Ata 1 hydro power plant. It should be added that back in 2004, the Kyrgyz govern-
ment had already signed a memorandum with the Russian energy monopoly RAO UES Rossii 
concerning the completion of two hydroelectric power plants on the Naryn river, Kambar Ata 
1 and Kambar Ata 2, in which the Russian company had pledged to invest US$2 billion. 
However, it was not clear whether Russia had indeed intended to engage in these projects or 
was just exerting pressure on Uzbekistan (which was anxious about losing some of its water 
resources if these two hydro power plants, together with other hydroelectric power projects 
in Tajikistan, were implemented). In general terms, Moscow was interested in taking control 
over the whole water management system in the region. In this context, the financial assi-
stance for Kyrgyzstan was commonly interpreted as a ‘fee’ for closing down the Manas base. 
On 29 May 2009, an agreement was signed extending the Russian lease of the military base 
in Kant to 49 years7. However, despite his earlier announcements, on 7 July 2009 Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev extended his country’s lease agreement with the USA for the Manas base, using the 
stratagem of renaming the base as the ‘Transit Centre’. The lease fee was raised to more than 
US$60 million8. Moscow expressed its ‘disillusionment’, and in response made attempts to 
establish a second military base in Kyrgyzstan; Russian deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin 
visited Bishkek to discuss this issue. Russia signalled that Osh was an optimal location for the 
base9. The draft agreement concerning the deployment was signed by Presidents Bakiyev and 
Medvedev on 1 August 2009, and the final agreement was to have been concluded before 
1 November10. However, the Kyrgyz side dragged the talks out, instead offering a site in the 
Batken district11 as a possible location. Finally, on the eve of the term’s expiry, Bakiyev anno-
unced that Batken would be the site of a Kyrgyz military training centre, built in cooperation 
with the USA, who pledged to invest $5.5 million12.
Moscow expressed its discontent with Bakiyev’s policy by intensifying its economic pressure 
on Kyrgyzstan, by launching an anti-Bakiyev campaign in the Russian media, and by deepe-
ning its contacts with the Kyrgyz opposition. The loan for the construction of the Kambar Ata 
1 hydro power plant (which had long been promised) disappeared from the three-year Rus-
sian-Kyrgyz economic cooperation plan of 27 February 2010. Moreover, Russia introduced 
a 100% export duty on oil products as of 1 April13. At the same time, the Russian media 
began broadcasting materials intended to discredit President Bakiyev and expose his corrupt 
clan and business system. The Kyrgyz government protested against this campaign14.
7 The lease can be extended 
by a further 25 years (http://
www.altair.com.pl/start-2987; 
accessed on 19 July 2010).
8 See Konrad Zasztowt, 
‘Rywalizacja Rosji i NATO 
w Azji Środkowej’, in Bezpie-
czeństwo Narodowe, 11/2009, 
p. 132-134 (publication in Polish). 
Washington also pledged to grant 
the Kyrgyz government a $117 
million non-refundable loan.
9 ‘Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime 
Collapses’, International Crisis 
Group, Asia Briefing no 102, 
Bishkek-Brussels, 27 April 
2010, p. 12.
10 http://www.altair.com.pl/
start-3266, accessed 
on 19 July 2010. 
11 ‘Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime 
Collapses’, op.cit.
12 KABAR news agency, 23 
October 2009. Several months 
later, it was announced that the 
centre would specialise in anti-
terror training. 
13 Marek Matusiak, ‘Kyrgyzstan’s 
president overthrown’, Eastweek 
14 (207), 14 April 2010, 
www.osw.waw.pl
14 The media were accused 
of being ‘partial’ by President 
Bakiyev himself (http://www.
regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/
kirghizia/1266427.html; ac-
cessed on 20 July 2010). 
On 7 April 2010, Kyrgyz Prime 
Minister Daniar Usenov asked 
the Russian ambassador 
Valentin Vlasov to influence 
the Russian media ‘which 
publish information […] 
that is not conducive to 
strengthening the friendly 
relations between the two 
countries’. Vlasov replied that 
these media had been provi-
ding ‘balanced and objective’ 
information concerning 
the situation in Kyrgyzstan 
(Interfax, 7 April 2010).
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During the weeks that preceded the overthrow of the government, Kyrgyz opposition po-
liticians paid a number of visits to Moscow. The two most ‘frequent flyers’ were Temirbek 
Sariyev (a businessman, former Member of Parliament, and the deputy prime minister in the 
subsequent interim government) and Felix Kulov (a police general and prime minister after 
the ‘tulip revolution’, but who has remained outside the government since the recent coup). 
On most occasions they met with officials from the Presidential Administration, but on the eve 
of the April coup, Sariyev was received by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin; upon his return to 
Bishkek, he announced that the Kyrgyz opposition enjoyed Putin’s support15.
Russia’s reaction to the coup 
and its attitude towards the new Kyrgyz government
Russia’s first reaction to the coup in Kyr-
gyzstan was a flat denial that Moscow had 
been involved in any way16. Moscow dec-
lared its neutrality, while at the same time 
expressing its understanding of the way in 
which the regime change had come abo-
ut. As President Dmitry Medvedev stated, 
‘this situation is Kyrgyzstan’s internal affair, 
but the form in which the protests erupted 
testifies to the extreme degree of discon-
tent that the government’s actions had pro-
duced among the general public’17.
Russia almost immediately de facto reco-
gnised the new government, the first state 
in the world to do so. The day after the 
coup, on 8 April, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called Roza Otunbayeva, then acting Prime 
Minister of Kyrgyzstan’s interim government. Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov stressed that 
Putin spoke to Otunbayeva as a Prime Minister18. Immediately after the coup, members of the 
interim government paid several visits to Moscow19. The Kremlin’s involvement was also visible 
in how the ousted Kurmanbek Bakiyev was persuaded to formally step down as president and 
leave the country. Bakiyev left Kyrgyzstan on 15 April, supported by a unit of Russian special 
forces (spetsnaz); he first headed to Kazakhstan, where he signed a letter of resignation, 
and then went on to Belarus. President Medvedev confirmed that he had been personally 
involved in this affair20. Russia also sent humanitarian aid to Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, on 26 
April Russia deported Moldomusa Kongantiyev, the interior minister of Bakiyev’s government, 
who had been badly wounded during riots in Talas, but had succeeded in leaving Kyrgyzstan. 
The deportation was quite dramatic: Kongantiyev was taken to the airport straight from his ho-
spital bed in Moscow, where he was being treated for injuries he had suffered during the riots. 
Despite some gestures of goodwill towards the interim government, just a few days after the 
coup, Moscow hinted that further support would not be unconditional, and would depend on 
how much Bishkek complied with Russian interests. For Moscow, the Otunbayeva govern-
ment’s attitude towards the American military presence in Manas was treated as a litmus test 
of her political intentions. The absence of explicit declarations concerning Manas was met 
with disappointment in Moscow. The problem was discussed by the Russian and American 
presidents during their meeting in Prague as early as 8 April. A ‘high-ranking Russian diplo-
mat’ disclosed that the Manas issue had divided Russia and USA, and added: ‘There can be 
only one military base in Kyrgyzstan – the Russian one’21. However on 11 April, Otunbayeva 
confirmed in a telephone conversation with the American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Maja Narbutt, ‘Kirgizja przed 
trzecią rewolucją’. Rzeczpo-
spolita daily, 22 May 2010 
(publication in Polish).
16 On 7 April 2010, the deputy 
minister of foreign affairs 
Grigory Karasin disclaimed 
responsibility for the coup 
(http://www.newsru.com/rus-
sia/07apr2010/no_participa-
tion.html; accessed on 9 July 
2010); Russia’s involvement 
in the Kyrgyz events was also 
disclaimed by Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin (http://www.
regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/
kirghizia/1271336.html; 
accessed on 20 July 2010).
 
 
17 http://www.newsru.com/arch/
russia/07apr2010/mdvkrgz.html; 
accessed on 9 July 2010.
 
 
18 Interfax, 8 April 2010.
19 Deputy Prime Minister 
Almazbek Atambayev visited 
Moscow on 8-12 April, De-
puty Prime Minister Temirbek 
Sariyev on 22 April, and Prime 
Minister Roza Otunbayeva 
on 9 May.
20 http://www.kremlin.ru/
news/7479; accessed 
on 9 July 2010.
21 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics 
/2010/04/08_a_3349220.
shtml; accessed on 9 July 2010.
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that Kyrgyzstan was determined to respect previous agreements, and on 16 April the deputy 
prime minister of the interim government, Omurbek Tekebayev, announced that the agre-
ement with the USA would be extended by another year, because the parliament – the only 
state body which is authorised to revoke it – will only be elected in autumn 2010. This was 
certainly far from satisfactory to Moscow, and proved that the new Kyrgyz government was 
not at Moscow’s complete disposal.
In its attempt to discipline the new government, Russia reached for an argument which 
it had exploited during the war with Georgia in August 2008: the protection of the Russian 
minority. On 15 April, the Russian foreign ministry expressed its concern over reports that the 
Russian population were falling victim to assaults and burglary22. Moscow also maintained 
contacts with representatives of all the ma-
jor political groups in Kyrgyzstan, including 
Felix Kulov and Askar Akayev, the latter 
being the former president of Kyrgyzstan, 
who was toppled in 2005 and is currently 
resident in Russia. On 1 July, a Coalition 
of Democratic Forces of Kyrgyzstan was 
established in Moscow, including the Kyr-
gyz National Revolutionary Committee under its leader Shadykan Jakypbekov. Both of these 
groups are almost unknown, but judging by their press release (in which Roza Otubayeva’s 
authority was deemed ‘usurpation’), the activists of this coalition would be ready to form 
a new government under Russian patronage23.
On 13 April, President Medvedev appointed General Vladimir Rushailo (a former Russian interior 
minister, and the Executive Secretary of the CIS) as special presidential envoy for relations with 
Kyrgyzstan. Rushailo was tasked with representing Moscow in its contacts with Kyrgyzstan’s 
government and opposition, and carrying out consultations concerning the developments and 
possible stabilisation. Rushailo’s nomination proves that the Kremlin is determined to activate 
its policy towards Bishkek, among other ways by trying to influence the Kyrgyz government’s 
staffing policy, so that it serves Moscow’s interests. One such example is the activity underta-
ken by Nikolai Bordyuzha, the Secretary General of the Russia-dominated Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Bordyuzha suggested that Bishkek appoint Miroslav Niyazov and 
Adakhan Madumarov, former secretaries of the Kyrgyz Security Council, as Kyrgyz represen-
tatives in talks with the CSTO. Meanwhile these two politicians, who have extensive contacts 
in Russia, are potential rivals to the interim government in its struggle for power24. Another 
politician regarded as ‘Russia’s man’ is Kubatbek Baibolov, who was a KGB officer of long stan-
ding, working for Soviet intelligence. On 12 June, Baibolov was appointed first deputy head of 
Kyrgyzstan’s State Security Service, and on 7 July he was named minister of the interior.
Following the constitutional referendum of 27 June, whereby Otunbayeva was authorized 
as temporary president, Russia (along with other states) formally recognised the new Kyr-
gyz government. It will acquire full legitimacy after the parliamentary elections scheduled 
for this autumn.
Russia’s position on the riots in southern Kyrgyzstan
On 10 June ethnic clashes broke out between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in Osh, 
Jalalabad and neighbouring regions in southern Kyrgyzstan, with a toll of several hundred vic-
tims. On 12 June, acting president Otunbayeva appealed to Russia for a military intervention, 
but Moscow refused, stressing its unwillingness to meddle in Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs, and 
restricting itself to strengthening the base in KantI; immediately after the coup, on 8 April, 
150 additional soldiers were sent to protect this base. On the same day, the Kyrgyz deputy 
22 ITAR-TASS, 19 April 2010.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 http://www.regnum.ru/news/
polit/1300179.html; accessed 
on 9 July 2010.
 
 
24 http://www.regnum.ru/news/
polit/1293794.html; accessed 
on 9 July 2010.
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25 http://www.regnum.ru/news/
polit/1277514.html; 
accessed on 9 July 2010.
 
 
 
 
 
26 President Medvedev’s state-
ments during his visit to the 
USA and Canada on 24 and 
28 June 2010 (http://www.
kremlin.ru/transcripts/8163 
and http://www.kremlin.ru/
transcripts/8182; accessed 
on 9 July 2010). In the se-
cond statement, the president 
referred to the constitutional 
referendum in Kyrgyzstan 
and expressed his anxiety 
over the decision to strengthen 
the parliament at the expense 
of presidential authority; 
in his opinion, this would not 
be conducive to the stability 
and controllability 
of the Kyrgyz state.
prime minister Omurbek Tekebayev mentioned the possibility of a Russian military intervention 
in Kyrgyzstan ‘should the situation in the country worsen’. Meanwhile, Russian public opinion 
has opposed intervention from the very start. In a poll conducted by VCIOM and published on 
25 April, 60% of respondents opposed Russia’s active participation in the Kyrgyz events25. 
Russia demonstrated a similar reaction to another appeal by Otunbayeva for support in pro-
tecting strategic facilities, including dams and barrages. On 14 June, while the riots were still 
ongoing, Bishkek was promised logistical, military and technical assistance (excluding arms 
supplies) during a special meeting of the secretaries of the CSTO states’ security councils, 
although direct intervention was ruled out. On 24 June, President Medvedev confirmed that 
Russia was not planning to send peace forces to Kyrgyzstan, although he mentioned that the 
CSTO could send a stabilisation contingent there, if need be.
Summary and attempted forecast
While reacting to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan, Moscow has also taken three perspectives into 
consideration: bilateral, regional and global. There is no evidence that Russia was directly 
involved in the coup, although it could have been said to have inspired it (for example, 
the accusations against Bakiyev aired on Russian TV – widely watched in Kyrgyzstan – 
undoubtedly fuelled the protests). Also there could have been some Russian lobbying 
to have President Bakiyev toppled, as can be proved by the Kyrgyz opposition mem-
bers’ visits to Moscow, and Temirbek Sariyev’s statement that Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin supported the Kyrgyz opposition. Moscow’s current key objective is to stabilise 
the internal political situation in Kyrgyz-
stan and strengthen the government 
in Bishkek so that they are able to control 
the situation in the country, because it is 
only thus that they can be a credible partner 
for Moscow. This approach has been reflec-
ted in President Medvedev’s statements: 
on the eve of the constitutional referen-
dum and immediately after it, he stressed 
the weakness and even the atrophy of the 
Kyrgyz state, and expressed his concern about the possibility of it splitting into two parts26. 
These statements were doubtlessly meant to ‘discipline’ Otunbayeva’s government. It sho-
uld be expected that Russia will continue with its behind-the-scenes promotion of ‘suitable’ 
Kyrgyz politicians, especially in the light of approaching parliamentary elections. Due to 
this, the election campaign may see Kyrgyz politicians curry favour with Moscow. Following 
the constitutional referendum of 27 June, the leading politicians of Otunbayeva’s camp – 
the deputy prime ministers Azimbek Beknazarov, Almazbek Atambayev, Temirbek Sariyev 
and Omurbek Tekebayev – stepped down from their posts and announced their intention to 
run in the parliamentary elections.
From the regional perspective, the prospect of a military intervention in Kyrgyzstan is of 
great importance. The decision not to send CSTO peace corps to southern Kyrgyzstan in 
June may have resulted from a lack of willpower on Russia’s part, caused by its anxiety of 
being dragged into a long-standing and bloody ethic conflict which could entail considera-
ble expenses and jeopardise Russia’s authority. Another reason could have been resistance 
from Russia’s partners, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Belarus. Uzbekistan oppo-
sed Russia’s direct military intervention, though on the other hand it fears that Kyrgyz insta-
bility will spill over into the region and Kyrgyzstan itself will turn into a ‘black hole’, taken 
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over by Islamic radicals and drug smugglers. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, is anxious 
about Uzbekistan strengthening its position in the region.
In this context, it seems possible that within the next few months a CSTO stabilisation mis-
sion will be sent to southern Kyrgyzstan. Such a mission would make it possible for Russia 
to strengthen its leverage over the region, as Russia would be the dominant partner in that 
mission. Russia’s decision to become involved would be welcomed by its international part-
ners, including the USA and China, who were hoping (in vain) that Moscow would intervene 
in Kyrgyzstan during the June riots. If the stabilisation mission fails, Russia will find it much 
harder to conduct a successful policy in the region, but if it is successful, it would be the 
beginning of the construction of a new se-
curity architecture, one element of which 
would be a new Russian military base 
in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Russia’s key strategic objective in the re-
gion, namely the monopolisation of the 
collective security system in post-Soviet 
Central Asia, requires a global perspective. 
Moscow is seeking the strongest possible mandate for its actions. One of the actions meant 
to strengthen this mandate was the signing on 18 March 2010 of a declaration of coopera-
tion between the CSTO and the United Nations. This agreement signifies that the CSTO is 
capable of making a contribution to guaranteeing security on the global level. The document 
also mentions political cooperation and a common fight against terror, drug smuggling and 
organised crime (such provisions have not usually been included in similar documents signed 
between the UN and regional organisations). It appears important that President Medvedev 
chose to announce certain decisions concerning Kyrgyzstan during his meetings with Pre-
sident Barack Obama in Prague and during his visits to the USA and Canada. Presumably, 
Russia made an offer to the US presenting Russia’s terms for cooperation in the region. 
In a Russian-preferred security system, Moscow would establish itself in a position of hegemony. 
An American presence (such as further use of the Manas base) would be possible, albeit on 
Russian terms; the stationing of US forces would have to be consulted with Russia directly. 
As for China, Moscow expects it to be ‘benevolently neutral’ and to cooperate within the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In return, Russia seems ready to accept some of China’s 
economic interests in the region.
It seems possible that within the next 
few months a CSTO stabilisation mis-
sion will be sent to southern Kyrgyzstan. 
Such a mission would make it possible 
for Russia to strengthen its leverage 
over the region.
